Crises of Legitimacy
The first major feature of African politics is the problem of leadership legitimacy. Legitimacy simply connotes wide acceptability of the government in power by the entire citizens. According to S.M. (1963) Lipset in his book “Political Man”, legitimacy of a government is determined by three factors: how power is acquired, the performance or efficiency of government, and the level of freedom and welfare enjoyed by the citizens. In Africa, rules governing electoral competition are not followed, elections, are not free and fair, the performance of most governments are poor, while the freedom and welfare of the people are not guaranteed.A government that lacks legitimacy is prone to have its policies misinterpreted, creates communication gaps between the government and the governed and may not enjoy the benefits of feed back on its policies that can assist in policy re-evaluation, and re-formulation. In the extreme, an illegitimate government imposes a reign of terror on the citizens to force them into submission or acquiescence.
The regimes of blood-thirsty Idi Amin Dada of Uganda typified this tendency in the past, and its contemporary equivalent is Robert Mugabe’s infamous rule in Zimbabwe. In the December 2007 General Elections in Kenya, incumbent President Muai Kibaki manipulated the electoral commission to deny the opposition candidate, Railia Odinga of Orange Democratic Coalition from emerging victorious.
After months of violence Kibaki agreed to a power sharing formulae, which created and gave the post of Prime Minister to the opposition candidate.
After months of violence Kibaki agreed to a power sharing formulae, which created and gave the post of Prime Minister to the opposition candidate.
In March 2008, Robert Mugabe re-enacted the Kenya drama in Zimbabwe, and ensured that the opposition challenger, Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change did not secure the mandatory 50 plus one percentage of the votes, required to win the election in the first ballot. Before he resigned as President, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa successfully brokered a power sharing deal between the two feuding parties. Whatever the pretences by Kikabi and Mugabe, there is no doubt that they no longer enjoy credibility as leaders and their governments have also ceased to possess electoral legitimacy. The Kenya and Zimbabwe’s cases are, by no means, unique; they merely represent the latest, and the frightful dimensions the crisis of legitimacy is assuming in Africa.
Corruption and Monetized Politics
Corruption has remained the bane of African politics. It has continued to undermine the effectiveness of political leadership. Awolowo (1966) defines corruption as abuse, misuse and disuse of power. Forms of corruption in African politics include bribery and manipulation of electoral process, nepotism in award of contracts and favouratism in dispensing patronage. While clientilism and patron-client relations are common in all societies, they define, and constitute the essence of African politics. Using Nigeria as a case study, Richard Joseph (2006) coined the word ‘prebendalism” to describe a situation “where an individual seeks a patron and leans on him in order to benefit from the privileges of the upper class” Joseph’s formulation is not too distinct from Karl Marx’s notion of “primitive accumulation” – acquiring wealth in excess of what is reasonably or economically justifiable. J.F. Bayart’s coinage of the term “politics of the belly” is understandable given the high level of poverty in most African states, but certainly was not intended to justify the massive corruption and looting of public treasury by some African leaders.
Before their exit from power, some Africa leaders, notably Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now CDR) were infamously reputed to be richer than their states. The consequence of the pervasiveness of corruption in African politics is not only absence of development but also decline in state capacity; and ultimate state failure. This problem is a major factor in the deepened economic stagnation and under-development of African states, arising from diversion of states resources meant for development to serve the private interests of political leadership.
In Nigeria, recent scandalous revelations about the diversion of PTDF funds, aviation intervention funds, National Integrated Power Project (NIPP), award of oil blocs and payment for signatures bonuses, are enough for us to conclude that in spite of public pretences to fight corruption, the menace appears to have been institutionalized in the nation’s body polity. When this is added to the God fathers syndrome, and the monetisation of the political space, it is no surprise that the culture of impunity is gaining ground in the country.
The Nigerian case illustrates the trend in most African states where governments are rarely responsible because they run from accountability at the polls. The process of governance not only lacks transparency, the rule of law is weak, while the mass media and civil society groups that are to serve as watch dogs are either inept, or have been compromised. It is a fact that where there is power and discretion there is always the possibility of abuse, especially when the power and discretion have to be exercised within the context of scarcity. This problem therefore calls for appropriate policy response, process monitoring and system re-alignment.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Explain the influence of money in African politics.
i. Intimidatory leader, who relies primarily on fear and instrument of coercion to assert his authority, and specialized in the use and/or threat of use of force to extract compliance from his fellow country men;
ii. The patriarchal leader, basically one who commanded neo-filia reverence, a near father like figure like Jomo Kenyatta and Nelson Mandela;
iii. The leader of Reconciliation, who relied for his effectiveness on qualities of tactical accommodation and capacity to discover areas of compromise between otherwise antagonistic view points; such leaders like Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria and Milton Obote of Uganda remained in control as long as he was successful in politics of compromise and synthesis;
iv. Mobilization leader, whose main drive was ideology, with a dose of charismatic qualities, which helped in mobilizing the populace in the direction of a particular social action, as effectively employed by Nyerere in Tanzania, and perhaps, Nkrumah, in Ghana;
Before their exit from power, some Africa leaders, notably Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now CDR) were infamously reputed to be richer than their states. The consequence of the pervasiveness of corruption in African politics is not only absence of development but also decline in state capacity; and ultimate state failure. This problem is a major factor in the deepened economic stagnation and under-development of African states, arising from diversion of states resources meant for development to serve the private interests of political leadership.
In Nigeria, recent scandalous revelations about the diversion of PTDF funds, aviation intervention funds, National Integrated Power Project (NIPP), award of oil blocs and payment for signatures bonuses, are enough for us to conclude that in spite of public pretences to fight corruption, the menace appears to have been institutionalized in the nation’s body polity. When this is added to the God fathers syndrome, and the monetisation of the political space, it is no surprise that the culture of impunity is gaining ground in the country.
The Nigerian case illustrates the trend in most African states where governments are rarely responsible because they run from accountability at the polls. The process of governance not only lacks transparency, the rule of law is weak, while the mass media and civil society groups that are to serve as watch dogs are either inept, or have been compromised. It is a fact that where there is power and discretion there is always the possibility of abuse, especially when the power and discretion have to be exercised within the context of scarcity. This problem therefore calls for appropriate policy response, process monitoring and system re-alignment.
SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Explain the influence of money in African politics.
Personalised Leadership
As a result of the dominance of a few individuals in the politics of African states, politics has always been based on personalized leadership. Ali Mazrui (1997:7) identified five leadership styles among African leaders:i. Intimidatory leader, who relies primarily on fear and instrument of coercion to assert his authority, and specialized in the use and/or threat of use of force to extract compliance from his fellow country men;
ii. The patriarchal leader, basically one who commanded neo-filia reverence, a near father like figure like Jomo Kenyatta and Nelson Mandela;
iii. The leader of Reconciliation, who relied for his effectiveness on qualities of tactical accommodation and capacity to discover areas of compromise between otherwise antagonistic view points; such leaders like Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria and Milton Obote of Uganda remained in control as long as he was successful in politics of compromise and synthesis;
iv. Mobilization leader, whose main drive was ideology, with a dose of charismatic qualities, which helped in mobilizing the populace in the direction of a particular social action, as effectively employed by Nyerere in Tanzania, and perhaps, Nkrumah, in Ghana;
v. Bureaucratic leader; the low-key type who relied on efficiency rather than evocation, procedure rather than passion.
Mazru’s typologies are closely related to David Apter’s views on political leadership in Africa, except that he laid emphasis on the integrative role of leaders in a plural African setting, in order to cope with the turbulence of political modernization. Hesitant to repress, but anxious to dominate the political scene, African political leadership, especially in the first decade of independence created a personality cult around themselves. Kwame Nkrumah, for instance, preferred to be called Osagefor (The saviour) while Nyerere also admired being called Nwalimu (The Great Teacher).
Mazru’s typologies are closely related to David Apter’s views on political leadership in Africa, except that he laid emphasis on the integrative role of leaders in a plural African setting, in order to cope with the turbulence of political modernization. Hesitant to repress, but anxious to dominate the political scene, African political leadership, especially in the first decade of independence created a personality cult around themselves. Kwame Nkrumah, for instance, preferred to be called Osagefor (The saviour) while Nyerere also admired being called Nwalimu (The Great Teacher).
Rather than institutions driving the political process the personal attributes of African leaders, either to hold the state together, or cause crises, are more important than the form of government, or the institution of checks and balances. For Instance, the stability which Ivory Coast enjoyed under Felix Houphouet Boigny, disappeared after his death and exit from office. While laying claim to be democratic most African leaders behave in the manner of maximum-military rulers, in effectively demonstrating J.J. Rousseaus view that “the strongest is never strong enough to be master unless he transforms might into right and obedience into duty”.
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